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Edited by *Barbara L. Tischler*

COVERING DISSENT

THE MEDIA AND THE ANTI-VIETNAM WAR MOVEMENT

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For Sarajane Miller-Small
and the millions of other women and men
whose antiwar activities
the media often misrepresented

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THE LAUNCHING OF A MOVEMENT, 1965

> The original commitment in Vietnam was made by President Truman, a mainstream liberal. It was seconded by President Eisenhower, a moderate liberal. It was intensified by the late President Kennedy, a flaming liberal. Think of the men who now engineer that war—those who study the maps, give the commands, push the buttons and tally the dead: Bundy, McNamara, Lodge, Goldberg, the President himself.
>
> They are not moral monsters.
>
> They are all honorable men.
>
> They are all liberals.[1]

SDS president Carl Oglesby electrified a crowd of thirty-five thousand with these words at a SANE-organized antiwar demonstration in Washington on November 27, 1965. This was the last of several notable protests during the year in which the civil war in Vietnam became an American war.

The *Washington Post*'s Alfred Friendly began his analysis of the event, headlined "Anti-War Parade Lacked Virility of Rights March," with:

> The weather was more sparkling than the gathering, which tended to be earnest, good-natured and non-muscular.
>
> To contrast yesterday's March on Washington for Peace in Vietnam with the civil rights march here on Aug. 3, 1963, is perhaps unfair but unescapable. The difference was a certain virility: that one had it—this one didn't.
>
> The event two years ago was joyful, full of promise about to be realized, swirling with emotion and full-throated. The issue was less intricate and debatable and the consensus about the justice of the cause was much more nearly universal. Yesterday's convocation was of a minority, embattled, on the defensive and espousing a minority position.[2]

An antiwar movement slowly began to develop in the United States in February, 1965, in response to the Johnson administration's decision to bomb North Vietnam. No other American action in Southeast Asia so catalyzed critics of the war. The image of the United States bombing a peasant nation with which it was not at war troubled people the world over and immediately

made it difficult for the administration to employ moral arguments to sell its case. "Stop the Bombing" became a central theme at antiwar demonstrations throughout Johnson's last three years in office. And his cause looked worse in late 1966 when bombs began falling closer and closer to North Vietnamese urban centers.

Although some Americans had earlier opposed other escalatory acts, particularly during the Gulf of Tonkin crisis the previous August, no groups organized effective demonstrations, marches, or other oppositional activities that attracted significant attention from the media, the public, or the administration. Even after the first round of bombing in early February, Women Strike for Peace (WSP) and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) could only enlist a few hundred stalwarts to picket the White House on February 10. It took a few months of sustained bombing for the movement to reach a point where leaders could gather a critical mass of protestors who would be noticed by other Americans.

SDS Demonstration in Washington, April 17, 1965

The first major demonstration of the anti-Vietnam War movement took place in Washington on Saturday, April 17, 1965.[3] Although it was easier to gather large crowds in New York City, Washington demonstrations were important because they guaranteed attention from print and broadcast media that were read and seen by legislators and government officials. Furthermore, the symbolic value of masses of protestors at the Capitol, the White House, or the Mall was potent compared to a demonstration in Central or Golden Gate Park.

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which started organizing the event in late December, had a head start on groups that slowly mobilized in February and March in response to the bombing. When its leaders began planning the then-obscure protest, they could not have predicted February's bombing decision, which immediately made their Washington weekend a focal point for all antiwarriors. In addition, when SDS leaders decided to issue their formal call for the April 17 demonstration on February 8, they did not know that day was the first of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam.

April 17 was the day before Easter Sunday, a day on which peace groups traditionally hold vigils and marches. Deferring to widespread interest among their constituents in the SDS demonstration, many of those groups shifted their activities to April 10. This gesture reflected the cooperation, on this occasion, between antiwar organizations and the more radical SDS. For its part, SDS adopted a moderate and non-exclusionary strategy in hopes of attracting as large a crowd as possible. For example, SDS-approved placards did not call for an *immediate* American withdrawal from Vietnam. As we shall see, in most of the demonstrations that followed, the language of official

slogans often set the tone for the events and even affected participation. However, organizers could not compel their foot soldiers to obey their fiats. Few in the SDS leadership on this occasion, for example, were pleased about the people who carried Viet Cong flags, but they had no way—and really no inclination—to try to exclude those carrying such radical symbols from their ranks.

Despite SDS's non-revolutionary approach, the fact that the group permitted organizations like the Progressive Labor Movement (later Party) (PL) and the Communist Party's DuBois Clubs to participate led civil rights leader Bayard Rustin and other liberals to threaten to withdraw their endorsements on the eve of the rally. At the last moment, Rustin, Socialist leader Norman Thomas, pacifist A. J. Muste, and Harvard professor H. Stuart Hughes satisfied themselves with a press release that expressed support for the demonstration, but pointed out that they welcomed only those groups opposed to totalitarianism. The statement, which implied that subversives were involved in the April 17 event, appeared in the print media on the morning of the demonstration. The first major anti-Vietnam War demonstration was off to a shaky start.

On that warm spring day in the nation's capital, busses carrying participants arrived from as far away as Maine and Mississippi. Students and faculty from over fifty colleges were among those represented in the generally youthful and overwhelmingly white crowd of more than twenty thousand. At first glance, this does not seem to be an especially large number considering the size of later demonstrations. It was, nonetheless, quite impressive for a protest against a war that almost all Americans at that time supported.

The day's events transpired without serious incident. Participants first gathered at the White House where they were met by a handful of placard-carrying counterdemonstrators, and then marched to the Sylvan Theatre on the south slope of the Washington Monument. There they heard, among others, Yale historian Staughton Lynd on the parallels between the French experience in Algeria and the American experience in Vietnam, Senator Ernest Gruening (D-AK) on the history of the war, journalist I. F. Stone on the mistakes made by the government, and Paul Potter, the president of SDS, who disagreed with Stone by claiming that the war was not merely a mistake, but an act fundamental to the system. Potter received the most enthusiastic reception from the crowd. Joan Baez, Judy Collins, the Freedom Voices (a group from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee), and Phil Ochs (who sang "Love Me, I'm a Liberal"), treated those assembled to music of professional quality. Such free concertizing, interspersed with speeches, became a drawing card at antiwar and other New Left demonstrations.

After the musical and political presentations concluded, protestors singing "We Shall Overcome" marched to the Capitol to present a petition to Congress. The petition called for an end to the war through the employment of a variety of options including a new Geneva Conference, negotiations with the National Liberation Front, and the institution of free elections in Vietnam. The petition also noted that funds for pressing domestic problems were being drained away by the war. No one appeared at the Capitol to accept the document. For a while, three hundred people sat down on the steps hoping to produce action from the authorities. Finally, after a policeman accepted the petition, the protest came to an uneventful close.

Demonstration leaders were pleased with this event. Except for the minor glitch at the Capitol, everything went smoothly. The crowd was larger than expected, the number of counterdemonstrators and provocateurs minimal. Washington had been the scene of countless political rallies over the years. Yet this one was special because of its size and scholarly speeches, including one from a senator, and the fact that although "war" had not been declared, the demonstration took place while Americans were in combat in Southeast Asia. And its moderate petition laid out several options for U.S. policymakers well short of immediate withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The first significant anti-Vietnam War demonstration deserved serious consideration by the media because it reflected accurately the development of opposition to the course President Johnson had set for the country when he ordered the bombing of North Vietnam two months earlier.

IN THE *NEW YORK TIMES*, A SMALL, PAGE-THREE ADVANCE story on the morning of the event noted that more than ten thousand "students" were expected in the capital.[4] The implication that the crowd would be composed solely of students was unfair. On the other hand, the prediction of only ten thousand made the actual number that did show up more impressive. Of course, such a prediction may have led journalists who followed the *Times*'s lead to treat the expected small demonstration lightly.

The next day, the demonstration made the front page with a misleading picture showing scattered picketers in front of the White House along with an almost equal number of counterdemonstrators. The headline—"15,000 White House Pickets Denounce War"—underestimated the crowd and incorrectly characterized the day's events as being confined to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

The accompanying story, however, described SDS accurately as "a left-leaning but non-Communist group" new to the peace movement and somewhat at odds among themselves over tactics.[5] The crowd it drew to Washington, according to the *Times*, featured a mixture of beards, blue jeans, tweeds, and clerical collars. The newspaper also presented an extended account of attempts by pro-administration Cornell students to stop busses taking students to the demonstration.

As for the speakers, the *Times* gave coverage only to Senator Gruening, and it was marginal at that. Because of this lack of attention to the overt political content of the demonstration, readers found it difficult to determine just what policies, short of opposition to the war, were being promulgated by the doves. Throughout the era, media coverage of demonstrations ignored the speakers in order to concentrate on crowd size, demographics, and behavior. Perhaps such omissions are more understandable later, when oppositional arguments had become familiar. At this juncture, the sorts of things Lynd, Stone, and the others were saying were newsworthy and represented thoughtful and rather sophisticated critiques of administration foreign policy. As one journalist noted in a discussion of how the fourth estate handles such issues in general: "The emotional vocabulary of the mass media doesn't lend itself to the discussion of complicated political issues, much less to moral ambiguity or moments of doubt."[6]

The *Times*'s story was not especially antagonistic or misleading, merely brief and incomplete; the treatment of SDS, which could have been played more radically, was fair. (The *Times* had run a balanced feature on the group in its March 15 issue.) Throughout the first half of 1965, much of the media, including the nation's chief newspaper of record, simply did not pay much attention to the developing antiwar movement.[7] With the polls overwhelmingly in support of the president and the movement composed mostly of students and young people, the media may have been correct in their assessment of the relative import of antiwar activities.

Nevertheless, sociologist Todd Gitlin, a former SDS leader, is especially disturbed by the way the *Times* trivialized the demonstration and ignored the ideas presented, the apparent black-white cooperation, and the presence of older people in the crowd. Even worse, he charges that the activities of the few right-wing counterdemonstrators were given disproportionate space, perhaps because editors were concerned that they would be attacked for being too favorable to war critics.[8]

The *Washington Post* offered a more balanced and nuanced account, a fact that should not be surprising since the march took place on its doorstep. (The venue always affected the quality and quantity of coverage accorded movement activities. This was particularly true for the way the *Times* and the *Post* dealt with demonstrations in New York and Washington, respectively.) In this case, on Sunday morning, April 18, the *Post*'s page-one headline referred to sixteen thousand marchers, slightly more than the estimate of fifteen thousand from the District police.[9] Journalists rarely accepted demonstration organizers' crowd estimates. Sometimes they were mentioned in the body of the stories but any attempt at balance was undermined when a seemingly "official" crowd size appeared in the headlines. That is, readers glancing at the figure in the headline and not reading much more of the story would have

concluded that SDS drew sixteen thousand to Washington on April 17, and not the more accurate number of at least twenty thousand. It is true, of course, that the difference between the *Post*'s sixteen thousand and the march leaders' twenty-five thousand was not as dramatic as the difference between two hundred thousand and five hundred thousand in later demonstrations.

Despite the fact that the police made only four arrests, the *Post* noted them early in its coverage. On the other hand, its reporter considered the demonstration generally orderly if somewhat chaotic, attributing the confusion, in part, to tourists who mingled with demonstrators that pleasant spring day. Although the *Post* ran no front-page pictures, its editors offered four on page 18, including one of an impressive-looking throng.

The *Post*'s reporter, who did mention that SDS president Potter received the most applause, quoted from his speech. He described Senator Gruening's remarks as well but also outlined the activities of the estimated one hundred counterdemonstrators and the seven Nazis in attendance. Given their very small numbers compared to those on the other side of the political fence, the counterdemonstrators received rather handsome coverage.

How much coverage of the hawks would have been fair? Was it their numbers alone or the colorful nature of their signs and chants that determined the amount of newsprint devoted to their activities? Certainly their presence always enlivened the story for the media, especially television.

Not surprisingly, the two regional dailies in Michigan, which relied on the wire services, paid little attention to the April 17 demonstration. *The Daily Tribune*, in a small UPI story on page 1 dated the day of the event, noted that by noon, fourteen to fifteen thousand had assembled in an orderly demonstration marred by only two arrests. The account in the evening newspaper listed groups in attendance opposed to the marchers, but gave no indication of their small numbers.[10] The only sign described was one from the counterdemonstrators, "Pink Colleges Turn out Yellow Reds," a strange editorial selection given the significance of the moderate placards chosen by SDS that dominated the scene.

Neither the *Tribune* nor the *Macomb Daily* published Sunday editions. Thus, Saturday's events sometimes appeared in their Monday editions. The *Tribune* chose not to run a follow-up on Monday, while the *Macomb Daily* ignored the demonstration on April 17, and on April 19 ran only an account of a small weekend protest at Johnson's Texas ranch.

Despite the importance, in retrospect, of the April 17 demonstration, the antiwar movement was not especially newsworthy yet. Newspapers and wire services may have been surprised by the size—and respectability—of the SDS rally and did not recover in time to offer it adequate coverage. After all, this was the first major rally of its kind and it had been organized by a fringe group of young radicals, the sort who often picketed the White House on

weekends. Moreover, even protest organizers were surprised by their relative success. The fact that few in the media considered the SDS demonstration important was reflected in the lack of coverage in *Time* and *Newsweek*.

CBS television did give the demonstration considerable attention that Saturday but seemed a bit unsure of how to handle it. For example, its own printed synopsis, which describes the film material in its archive, refers to demonstrators as "beatniks," although that word apparently was not used on air. But the beatniks of the late fifties had little in common with the politicos of SDS. And if newspeople referred to the SDS crowd as beatniks privately, that colored the way they dealt with them on screen.

CBS emphasized the picketing of the White House, not the speeches or mass rally. One reason may have been the presence of the counterpicketers, whose colorful signs read, "Peace Creeps" and "We Want Dead Reds." The network devoted almost as much time to the right-wingers as the left-wingers, even though the accompanying pictures revealed a great disparity between the size of the two groups. Further, the editors overused shots of beatnik types or bearded people among the dovish demonstrators. Their cameras paused as well for a glimpse at their sneaker-clad feet (it was too early in the season for sandals).[11] Viewers of CBS's account of the demonstration learned little about why the doves were in Washington, and especially, little about their political programs. They did learn to associate beards and sneakers with the movement.

Contrast the mainstream print and broadcast reportage with the *Guardian*'s description of a crowd of twenty-five thousand that constituted "The Greatest Peace Demonstration in American History."[12] The left-wing weekly had a point. This may have been the largest such demonstration (at least in recent memory) and thus deserved the special treatment its reporters and photographers accorded it. They claimed that although 75 percent of the protestors were students, the crowd came from all over the United States, included many "negroes," and certainly made up a "peaceful legion." Instead of spending much time on the few incidents of violence provoked by the counterdemonstrators, the weekly printed long excerpts from the speeches of Potter and Lynd. With those excerpts, extensive photographic display, and generally accurate, if partisan, reporting, the *Guardian* provided its limited readership with one of the most complete and professional accounts of the SDS demonstration on April 17, 1965, available in the American media.

NOT HAVING PAID ATTENTION TO THE *GUARDIAN*'S EUPHORIC coverage, the White House itself evinced little concern for the demonstration. In a note to Johnson on April 14, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy referred briefly to a "1eft-wing student protest rally" expected that weekend.

Such a casual reference could have convinced the president that the demonstration deserved little attention.[13]

The following Monday, in reaction to weekend news stories, Jack Valenti told Johnson that some newspaper editors were getting "a little edgy" about Vietnam—they were not opposed to administration policy, merely "uneasy" about where it was going. The aide suggested that Johnson meet with some of them to respond to their concerns.[14]

As for the affect of the demonstration on White House opinion indicators, mail summaries revealed not only a rise in the number of letters received on the Vietnam issue after the SDS came to Washington, but a swing in favor of the administration. Letters ran against the Vietnam policy at a ratio of more than 5 to 1 (3,276–600) for the week ending April 8; they were less than 2 to 1 (2,479–1,431) against it for the week ending April 29. That week, the White House received a total of 36,413 letters, which means that 11 percent dealt exclusively with Vietnam.[15] The 36,000 letters, which by no means reflected a random sample of 240 million Americans, seem to be an insignificant indicator of opinion. Nevertheless, Johnson's operatives kept a close watch on fluctuations in mail-flow patterns, even though professional public opinion analysts would have scoffed at such an unscientific indicator.

Considering the relative decline of dovish letters, as well as the president's overwhelming support in the polls and the positive response to his conciliatory Johns Hopkins University speech of April 7, it was easy to see why the administration could afford to take a cavalier attitude toward the first major antiwar demonstration of the era. Of course, given the relative lack of interest in that activity shown by the media, particularly the newsmagazines, the public had not yet been exposed to enough antiwar demonstrations for anyone to worry much about their impact. And even when it was covered, as in the *Times* and the *Post*, the SDS protest was framed in a way unlikely to attract middle-class readers to antiwar ranks.

National Teach-In, May 15, 1965

The SDS-led demonstration was not the only significant activity on the antiwar front in the spring of 1965. From late March through April, the teach-in phenomenon swept through scores of campuses, creating a new tool for the movement.[16] Although organizers billed them as free and open discussions that included government representatives, most speakers, faculty, and students who participated were critical of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

The Inter-University Committee for a Public Hearing on Vietnam, a loose confederation of teach-in committees, organized a national teach-in for Saturday, May 15. The faculty-dominated committee obtained a commitment from

National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to participate as the chief government spokesperson at a fifteen and one-half hour teach-in during which pro and antiadministration speakers would be balanced. Organizers attempted to present equal numbers of tickets to both sides, but the vast majority of the audience was of a dovish persuasion.

The teach-in took place at the Sheraton Hotel in Washington before a live audience of three thousand. Phone lines to 122 colleges brought the debate to over one hundred thousand students and faculty. In addition, the National Educational Television Network (a forerunner of PBS, with limited facilities) covered the unprecedented event live. The commercial networks offered summaries during prime time and occasionally broke into their programming with brief live remotes.[17]

Taking the event seriously, the State Department prepared briefing papers for participants who supported the administration. Three hours before the start of the teach-in, McGeorge Bundy announced that he had to withdraw because the president had dispatched him to the civil-war-torn Dominican Republic on an emergency mission. We now know, as was suspected at the time, that Johnson did not want Bundy to participate in the teach-in and thus inflate its importance. When his absence was announced, many in the well-dressed and well-mannered crowd groaned.

Bundy's note of apology, which was read to the crowd, reminded the nation's enemies that the United States was united and strong; those enemies should not get the wrong impression from seven hundred faculty members who opposed Vietnam policy. Bundy's figure greatly underestimated the numbers of faculty and others who then opposed American involvement in the war.[18]

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., became the main administration spokesperson in Bundy's absence. The distinguished historian and former Kennedy aide was the most famous participant in the teach-in. The polite audience, many of whom took notes throughout the program, remained quietly hostile to his presentation even though Schlesinger was far from a hawk. For example, while supporting Johnson in general, he called for less bombing and the dispatch of marines currently in the Dominican Republic to Vietnam for ground operations.

The teach-in was marked by civil, scholarly exchanges with few extreme positions presented either from the right or the left. The chief antiwar spokespersons were Cornell Southeast Asian expert, George McT. Kahin and University of Chicago political scientist Hans Morgenthau. One of the more unusual speakers was Isaac Deutscher, a noted Marxist (Trotskyist) historian, who discussed the origins of the Cold War. It was not often that he had the chance to speak to a non-sectarian assemblage.

A unique event, the teach-in underscored the growing concern about the war on the nation's elite campuses. With one hundred thousand participating vicariously over the phone lines, it was the largest antiwar activity to date. This first teach-in demonstrated that many of those who opposed U.S. policy in Southeast Asia were mature, fair-minded people who wanted to engage the administration in serious debate in the battle for public opinion.

The teach-in was an easy event for journalists to cover. It had been well-planned, speeches were the centerpiece, and the orderly crowd was contained in one room. Organizers expected more journalistic interest in their political ideas than had been the case during the SDS rally. They were not disappointed.

ON SUNDAY, MAY 16, THE DAY AFTER THE TEACH-IN, THE *NEW York Times* awarded the event front-page treatment along with a photograph of Schlesinger. The article led with Bundy's absence, a theme that reappeared on the jump page along with a separate piece, entitled "Bundy's Absence a Blow to the Crowd."[19] Most of that page was devoted to the teach-in with excerpts from the main speakers evenly balanced, although Schlesinger's comments were something of a mixed blessing for the administration. The next day the *Times* published two pages of excerpts from several speeches.[20]

Its reporter at the Sheraton described a crowd of mostly young students, some sporting beards, though fewer than one would find on campuses. The reporter thought that the bearded Deutscher resembled Lenin, an accurate but gratuitous comment. The interest in beards and sandals and other countercultural trappings appears in almost all media stories throughout the entire period, even at such a bourgeois event as the teach-in. Nevertheless, the *Times*'s coverage was full and fair, capturing the significance of the unusual activity.

The *Washington Post*'s front-page photograph on May 16 supported its description of the crowd at the Sheraton as mostly clean-cut, short-haired, and clad in coats and ties. (Photographs selected to accompany antiwar movement stories did not always reflect accurately the nature of the activity.) As in the *Times*, Bundy's absence was the lead item. In addition, the Washington daily noted prominently Schlesinger's deviations from the administration line. And even more than the *Times*, most of the *Post*'s speech excerpts were critical of official policy. Of course, one could argue that that was the news; the administration had presented its position many times before.

In a separate piece, a *Post* reporter looked suspiciously at Bundy's "abrupt withdrawal" as perhaps having been trumped up by the president.[21] An analysis on the following page noted accurately that while the doves had been strong in their critiques, they had little to offer in the way of practical alternative strategies. Indeed, the writer contended, Johnson might have fared better than expected because of that factor.

Finally, in a pleasant human-interest story on still another page, the *Post* explained how an "Aura of Classroom Surrounds Viet Debate."[22] Students took notes, scholars exchanged witty academic jibes and maintained decorum at an impressive exercise in reasoned debate in a democratic society.

The Bundy story was also the big news for the wire services that Saturday. Under its "Late News Flashes" feature that ran down the left side of its front page, *The Daily Tribune* headed its teach-in "flash," "Bundy Out of 'Teach-in' Debate."[23] The following Monday, the AP's even-handed analysis, which suggested there was no clear winner in the lengthy debate, offered a variety of comments on the impact of the event.[24] To be sure, activists thought they had won the teach-in with their superior intellectual and moral arguments. Nevertheless, at this stage in the movement, such balanced treatment from the AP had to be considered a plus.

Newsweek devoted two columns to the teach-in, along with pictures of Morgenthau and Schlesinger, "Highbrow to Highbrow."[25] Less than positive in its history of the teach-in movement ("droning diatribes," "considerable heat and occasional light"), the magazine nonetheless liked the national event a little better than the newspapers. During the "twelve [*sic*] windy hours," Bundy came in for his lumps for pulling out at the last minute and Morgenthau was labeled incorrectly "pro-withdrawal." *Newsweek* accorded Schlesinger the largest play in the eight paragraphs that described the debaters' positions. Yet since many of his statements were critical of Vietnam policy, readers received more anti- than proadministration material in a story that ultimately approved of the teach-in.

Time was not so approving in its two paragraphs on the event, which appeared within a lead article on the war.[26] The newsweekly labeled it a "platform for interacademy cattiness and pointless caterwauling." Moreover, according to its reporter, antiadministration academics did not possess enough information about Southeast Asia to be credible critics. Throughout much of 1965, *Time*, more hostile than *Newsweek*, either underplayed the movement's activities or attacked its legitimacy. This is not surprising considering founder Henry Luce's special interest in halting the spread of communism in Asia, the weekly's general conservatism, and its especially nasty and snide attitude toward America's perceived enemies.

CBS offered much more favorable treatment of the teach-in on its several telecasts that day than Luce's newsweekly. Again, the two major figures were Morgenthau and Schlesinger. The former, with a pronounced German accent, may have appeared something less than "American" when he pointed out that we were fighting a war against guerillas in Vietnam with inappropriate methods. Schlesinger, sporting a bow tie that might have struck some as an eccentricity, claimed that there were "reasonable and decent men on all sides of the debate," though he hoped that the United States would persevere in its

effort to obtain a fair negotiated settlement. The cameras caught him laughing with an audience of serious-looking scholars in coats and ties. Interestingly, in a voice-over during one of the earlier stories that ran during the day of the teach-in, a CBS correspondent still expected an appearance by Bundy and maybe even a surprise appearance by Johnson. Bundy's non-appearance became the major aspect of the story on the Sunday night news.

Overall, in terms of media treatment, the teach-in was a success for the antiwar movement. Participants appeared in the print and electronic media as serious and well-behaved. The fact that the press reported dovish arguments in some detail, along with responses from administration supporters, lent legitimacy to antiwar criticism. The administration had feared such an outcome.

AS EVIDENCED BY BUNDY'S WITHDRAWAL, JOHNSON AND HIS aides took the teach-in and its coverage seriously. That move was handled clumsily because the event drew more attention than might have been the case had Bundy initially refused to participate or at least withdrawn a week earlier. The withdrawal looked even more foolhardy after Bundy did so well, according to the media, in his "make-up" televised debate on June 21.

National Security Council (NSC) aide Chester Cooper expressed concern about the impact of the teach-in, fearing it "prompted a rethinking of the adequacy of the program centering on the American Friends of Vietnam" proadministration rally that had been scheduled for June 5 at Michigan State University.[27] Writing that same day to Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow, chair of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, thought that administration involvement in the event was a good thing since it "defused quite a lot of tension on our flank." On the other hand, Rostow did not think the government had much to gain from many more such events.[28]

In the one editorial on the teach-in clipped for the White House files, *Los Angeles Times* columnist Bill Henry wrote of the "egghead revolt" that "shook up" the administration.[29] Henry may have overstated the case, but clearly the administration perceived the antiwar movement as having gained through the teach-in and its generally favorable coverage, something Johnson had been concerned about when Bundy lent his celebrity to the event.[30]

The teach-in was another indication of growing antiwar sentiment in the population, especially on the campuses. Yet judging by the White House mail flow, its impact on public opinion was marginal. Johnson's mail clerks counted 504 favorable letters and 1,317 unfavorable letters on the war during the week ending May 13. This was followed by a diminution in volume in the two weeks after the teach-in with the count at 359–753 and 111–390 against administration policy. In June, only 12 percent of those polled called for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.[31] That figure represented a drop in four points since April and one point since May. Perhaps Walt Rostow was correct when he

suggested that the teach-in served as a harmless way for antiwar critics to blow off steam and then retire to the sidelines for a while.

Organizers of the teach-in did not expect to reach the general public. They aimed their scholarly arguments at a small attentive public and an elite audience that may not have been moved to write letters to the president.

However the White House evaluated the teach-in, the media took it seriously and generally reported the arguments presented at the Sheraton accurately and in detail. Despite the Bundy story stealing the headlines, antiwar activists had to be pleased with the way they were treated by journalists. Observers viewed the civilized forum as a wonderful tribute to the democratic system, certainly an improvement over mass demonstrations led by radical young people. Yet since the event was not followed by any dramatic opinion shift or even a noticeable growth in the antiwar movement, one must wonder about its effectiveness. The most that could be said for it is that it reenforced those who already had dovish leanings and may have planted a seed for others who recognized that challengers of administration policy were developing legitimacy.

The teach-in soon faded as a major movement activity. Considering the way most of the media admired that sort of event, one wonders why antiwar leaders did not schedule more of them periodically. Of course, editors and producers would have become bored with the format, which offered little action aside from cerebral talking heads. Here we have a great paradox of this study: The media approve of orderly middle-class oppositional activities. But they are not very newsworthy if they occur frequently. The media generally do not approve of radical and disorderly demonstrations but they make interesting stories. Unfortunately for demonstration leaders, such stories could be counterproductive. This would be the case for the next major demonstrations in 1965, the International Days of Protest.

First International Days of Protest, October 15–16, 1965

The May 15 teach-in bore little relationship to the International Days of Protest demonstrations of October 15 and 16, 1965. The organizers, their lieutenants, and the foot soldiers all came from a different sector of the fast-developing antiwar movement than those who earlier ran and participated in the Inter-University Committee for a Public Hearing on Vietnam.

Antiwar activists attending the Committee of Unrepresented People's demonstrations in Washington in early August used the occasion to form a new umbrella organization, the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCCEWVN). This loose coalition of left-of-center groups planned to meet the escalatory moves of the Johnson administration with a series of rallies and marches in the United States and around the world in the

middle of October.[32] Although the NCCEWVN was the titular organizing body of the International Days of Protest, local committees were virtually autonomous.

At least one hundred thousand mostly young people in as many as eighty American cities took part in antiwar activities on Friday and Saturday, October 15–16. The International Days of Protest was the largest series of demonstrations to date. The most important actions took place in New York City and in Berkeley and Oakland.

The main happening in New York on Friday, a dramatic display of antiwar sentiment, occurred outside the Whitehall Street Army induction center. There, David J. Miller, in view of television cameras and three hundred supporters, burned his draft card. This was the first widely-publicized case of such an act of civil disobedience. It also represented an escalation in dovish tactics that would alienate mainstream, "law-abiding," antiwar critics. But it certainly was mediagenic.

The next day in Manhattan, from twenty to twenty-five thousand people marched from 94th Street to 69th Street for a rally, where they attempted to hear, among other speakers, maverick journalist I. F. Stone. The marchers had been denied a permit to hold their event in an area of Central Park where acoustics would have been better. As many as one thousand counterprotestors sporting proadministration banners and placards lined the parade route to jeer the doves. No other major protest produced so many counterdemonstrators, albeit at a proportion of one in twenty. Among them were egg and paint throwers who participated in the day's main lawless activities. Throughout the nation, almost all of the violence and ensuing arrests that weekend involved anti-antiwar protestors who harassed and provoked peaceful demonstrators. This proved to be the case for several years. Yet for those not reading press accounts carefully, unruly behavior appeared to be widespread at antiwar demonstrations, irrespective of its origins.

The New York crowd, which was predominantly youthful, did contain a noticeable minority of adults. Some of those who paraded carried life-size dummies caricaturing the president, children held colorful balloons, while others waved placards with the official march slogan, "Stop the War in Vietnam Now." The demonstration, like the April SDS affair, was non-exclusionary. Its leaders did, nevertheless, try to stop participants from carrying placards with more extreme slogans. Moreover, not all on the Saturday march supported the Friday draft-card burning.

The key group in the organizing coalition, the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee, was led by Norma Becker, one of the more anonymous leaders of the movement, at least in terms of media attention.[33] Among others involved were A. J. Muste and Dave Dellinger. Sponsoring associations included the Committee on Non-Violent Action (CNV), the Socialist Worker's

Party (SWP), the War Resisters League (WRL), AFL-CIO chapters, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), SDS, PL, and the Communist Party.

On the West Coast, the Vietnam Day Committee, composed mostly of Berkeley students, planned to march to the Oakland Army Terminal to leaflet soldiers on their way to Vietnam. After a campus teach-in in the evening of October 15, as many as fifteen thousand young people began to walk to Oakland where four hundred riot police awaited them. The marchers did not have a parade permit to cross into the city. After discussions among the leadership about whether to challenge the police lines, the group returned to Berkeley without reaching its goal.

On the next afternoon, about five thousand youthful demonstrators attempted the same march only to be met again by Oakland police and this time, by marauding Hell's Angels as well. The latter waded into the crowd producing scores of injuries and arrests. After the disorder abated, protestors sat down in the street for an hour to listen to speeches and then disbanded peacefully, again without having reached their goal.

Among other activities that weekend, demonstrations outside the Selective Service office in Ann Arbor, Michigan were noteworthy. There, thirty-eight people were arrested, including the editor of the student newspaper. In a few venues, such as Cleveland, counterdemonstrators outnumbered demonstrators. Marches and other protests also took place in many European cities.

As the first nationwide—and international—series of demonstrations, the International Days of Protest deserved considerable attention. Both the New York and Berkeley actions had their dramatic moments and produced violent reactions from bikers and hawks that made for sensational stories. In almost all cases of violence that weekend, lawful demonstrators were set upon by right-wing groups.

Of course, the obvious left-wing and youthful coloration of the protestors made them less sympathetic to middle-class journalists and editors—and their audiences. Moreover, the Days of Protest were difficult for the media to cover since they took place in so many locales over two days. No single crowd was larger than twenty-five thousand although the total number of demonstrators in scores of states and foreign countries was unprecedented in the brief history of the movement. With journalists just beginning to learn how to cover such events, the International Days of Protest tested their resources as well as their objectivity.

THE *NEW YORK TIMES* MADE THE DAYS OF PROTEST ITS LEAD story on Saturday, October 16. A sub-headline called attention to unlawful behavior—police halting the Oakland march and the arrests in Ann Arbor. Further, early in the story, the reporter mentioned that an American flag had been torn. On the jump page, which included a picture of the Berkeley teach-in, the draft-card burning at the Whitehall center and the Oakland march dominated the coverage.[34]

Although the *Times* emphasized the clashes and civil disobedience, those were obviously the most colorful events of the first International Day of Protest. Moreover, given the relatively small numbers involved on Friday, the New York newspaper was generous in its attention. That attention reflected increased media interest in antiwar demonstrations since the spring, albeit concentrated on potentially violent and unlawful activities. Administration supporters contributed to that increased interest with warnings concerning the left-wing, even communist nature of the weekend's activities.[35] The fact that real communists and socialists participated in leadership positions in the Days of Protest coalitions validated their warnings. When many Americans read that leftists were involved in the protests, they found it easy to dismiss or oppose such activities, even if they were becoming skeptical about their government's involvement in Southeast Asia.

The next day, the *Times*'s coverage of Saturday's events, although generally accurate, again emphasized unlawful behavior with a front-page photograph of police seizing a counterdemonstrator. The fact that the arrestee was a hawk may have been lost on those who read the headlines: "10,000 in City Parade Join World Protest on Vietnam / Violence Breaks out in Several Communities—Pickets Arrested" and "Marchers Heckled Here—Eggs and a Can of Paint are Thrown."

The headlines were not entirely inaccurate but the figure of ten thousand was a serious underestimation that came from the police, though the reporter later offered other estimates that ran as high as twenty thousand. In addition, the emphasis on violence may have made the protestors appear to be an unruly lot, which they were not. Another picture inside the paper showed a Hell's Angels biker being subdued by the police.[36] Readers glancing at the picture might have concluded that the roughneck was an antiwar protestor.

Such coverage was not helpful to the movement. Middle-class *Times* readers, who along with their paper were beginning to express concern about the war, could have become leery about attending future mass demonstrations because of their apparently violent nature.

As for the makeup of the crowd, the *Times* noted that "Participants . . . included members of left-wing groups from many college campuses . . . [who] comprise a small fraction of the college population at schools where they have been formed." That gratuitous editorializing could have been balanced with an estimate of the percentage of students who generally supported antiwar activities.

In New York City, the *Times* noticed non-students in the crowd as well, including adults who were "well dressed." However, they and their comrades

marched in a manner "jarring [to] the quiet elegance of a residential neighborhood." Further, the *Times* correspondent described in detail each of the handful of incidents that led to the arrests of four people. With so much space devoted to that aspect of the demonstration, it is not surprising that the paper could spare only a few lines for Stone's keynote address.

The *Times* was not alone in its emphasis on the most unruly aspects of what were generally decorous rallies and marches. In its Saturday issue, the *Washington Post* stressed the potential for violence in Berkeley and noted incidents of egg throwing and scuffling in other cities.[37] With no major activities planned for the capital, the *Post* did not give as much space as the *Times* to the first day of the weekend protests.

The next day, however, they took the lead position on the front page with the headline, "Protests Staged In Many Cities Over Viet Policy: Clashes Occur in New York and Berkeley, Calif."[38] The headline was a mixed blessing for the doves. On the one hand, the influential Washington daily highlighted the clashes; on the other, the "many cities" reference suggested an event of some magnitude. The accompanying photograph of the D.C. picketers, however, was unimpressive, with their numbers noted as 160.

More than half of the *Post*'s copy dealt with hecklers, paint-throwing, and scuffles in New York and California that attained "near-riot proportions." In addition, its reporters counted only ten thousand New York marchers.

Even more than the *Times*, the *Post* saw the International Days of Protest in a light unfavorable to the doves. From 1965 to 1968, the *Post*'s editorial-page director was Russell Wiggins, a friend and supporter of the president who was named ambassador to the United Nations in 1968 by a grateful Lyndon Johnson. Although there was some distance between his page and the rest of the paper, his commentaries helped to balance material favorable to the antiwar movement written by his colleagues. Its editorial page changed dramatically after Wiggins left the scene.[39]

On this occasion, the *Post*'s reportage—as well as its editorials—may have influenced government officials and readers alike to dismiss this largest protest to date as a radical affair that had been challenged by many patriotic Americans. It is true, of course, that the non-exclusionary NCCEWVN did attract left-wing sectarian protestors unpopular with establishment papers like the *Post*. Whatever the reason, its negative treatment of the International Days of Protest was an important public-relations setback for the antiwar movement in Washington.

In the Midwest, *The Daily Tribune*'s wire-service protest story on Saturday, in the lead position on the front page, concentrated on nearby Ann Arbor where it listed students who had been arrested.[40] The article noted that the draft board protest "marred the UM homecoming festivities." One of those arrested was the editor of the *Michigan Daily*, a person, the *Tribune* informed

its readers, who the previous week had called for the legalization of marijuana.

Arrests nationally dominated wire-service stories in the *Tribune* on Monday.[41] Photographs showed scuffles in New York, Berkeley, and Austin. Further, a caption writer made an editorial point with: "New York City police subdue an angry man who hurled red paint at anti-war demonstrators." The writer then alerted readers to note the sign the arrested man dropped. It read: "Win the War." The story that followed stressed the violence nationwide and how police and university officials saved the day in Detroit and Ann Arbor.[42] Yet, leaders of the protest were reported as being "pleased" with their activities. Readers might have asked how protestors could be pleased by all those arrests and confrontations unless that was what they had had in mind in the first place.

A few miles down the road, Saturday's *Macomb Daily* emphasized the wire service's theme of violence with the arrests in Ann Arbor featured prominently on the front page.[43] University of Michigan protestors were said to have ripped up an American flag on a homecoming float, while, on his own campus, a Wayne State University protestor spoke unpatriotically about the flag. The caption under a picture of the Berkeley teach-in noted that only two hundred out of a student body of thirty thousand participated. That blatant editorializing was simply not true. In addition, none of the *Daily*'s wire-services excerpts mentioned the reasons that drove the demonstrators into the streets for the International Days of Protest.

The *Daily*'s UPI front-page story on Monday highlighted the arrest of David J. Miller for burning his draft card. The AP retrospective on the weekend's events referred to the demonstrators as "pacifists," a description used earlier for Miller.[44] The wire service offered a figure of seventy thousand for total participation nationwide with ten thousand in New York, numbers that were said to have pleased the organizers. China was said also to have been pleased by the demonstrations while an administration spokesperson and a GI were not. To its credit, the AP reported that the demonstrations were generally orderly and that hecklers were responsible for most of the problems.

The wire-service accounts run by the *Macomb Daily* on Monday were far more balanced than those selected by *Tribune* editors on the same day. With access to the often even-handed AP and UPI reports, editors used parts of them to form a story that confirmed their own analysis of what "really" happened. Moreover, local papers, with much less space than the *Times* and *Post* to allocate to national stories, generally highlighted the most unusual, dramatic, or violent aspects of demonstrations.

Published on the Wednesday following the weekend, the *Village Voice* decried the fact that the Sunday papers had emphasized "violence and bizarre" occurrences when the New York doves were mostly orderly and plainly

dressed. On the other hand, two out of three pictures the *Voice* ran involved confrontations between demonstrators and counterdemonstrators. Though unrepresentative, such action photographs are more interesting even to readers of counter-cultural publications than simple images of people marching or listening to speeches. Sympathetic to the demonstration, the *Voice*'s correspondent Paul Cowan nevertheless estimated the New York crowd at only between fifteen and twenty thousand. In a departure from the mainstream media, he did devote one-third of his account to Stone's and Dellinger's speeches.[45]

With more extensive coverage than the *Voice*, including a front-page story headlined "The Great Protest Against the War," the *Guardian* counted thirty thousand demonstrators in New York, the largest peace parade in history. Like the *Voice*, the *Guardian* offered extensive excerpts from the speeches and pointed out the many ordinary-looking adults in the peaceful assemblage. If the FBI wanted to find out who was in this parade, the *Guardian* provided a detailed, contingent-by-contingent list of groups along the route. No other publication paid this sort of useful attention to antiwar demonstrations.[46]

The *Guardian* had a week to prepare its story. Also looking back at the International Days of Protest from the perspective of a week, *Newsweek* interpreted the one hundred thousand total turnout for "Battle of Vietnam Day" as disappointing to the movement.[47] (The *Guardian* had been ecstatic that seventy-five thousand turned out nationwide.) According to *Newsweek*, "Many students, it seemed, had either tired of protest, accepted the U.S. role in Southeast Asia or were too busy with their studies or other protests to bother." Indeed, the antiwar movement may have reached its "saturation point." To punctuate this theme, *Newsweek* reported the State Department's claim that it ignored the protests because they involved such a small percentage of the population. For his part, administration supporter Senator Thomas Dodd (D-CT) labeled the Days of Protest communist-run. Most students, according to *Newsweek*, were not radical and many supported the administration. With arrests and radicals dominating the stories, readers could easily conclude that the antiwar movement was failing and unimportant.[48]

The following week, the apparently failing movement made the newsweekly's cover with a picture of demonstrators who appeared surprisingly middle class. Photographs that accompanied the story showed an antidovish heckler, marchers wearing skull masks, a Walt Kelly cartoon-strip poking fun at long-haired young people, and an antiwar sign ("a vocal minority") in the background at an Iowa State-Colorado football game.[49]

The long feature story began with clean-cut protestors in the offices of the WRL. Facing the draft, a "tiny but noisy minority was making newspaper headlines" with their resistance to induction.[50] *Newsweek* considered the antiwar movement in general to be larger then just the resisters, including intellectuals, pacifists, and radicals. Moreover, although most who marched the previous weekend were described as sincere and well-groomed, many of their leaders were scruffy left-wingers with ulterior motives. *Newsweek*'s several stories also emphasized the impact of the movement on the draft and, ultimately, on Hanoi and Beijing who cheered on American doves.[51]

The newsweekly described a fragmented antiwar movement with all sorts of motives, including simple draft-dodging, to be found among its adherents. The New Left was "often bearded and sandaled and nearly always verbose and earnest"; the SDS Chicago office a shabby place of "Bohemian squalor."[52] Despite these negative impressions, the magazine did devote space to SDS president Carl Oglesby and his ideas, few of which sounded revolutionary or dangerous. But the magazine reprinted an alleged movement pamphlet explaining tactics to use to dodge the draft including the feigning of homosexuality and even bed-wetting.[53]

Newsweek's unflattering cover story was not far from the mark in some respects. Many of the people involved in the International Days of Protest leadership were bohemian-looking, bearded, even sandaled. Some foot soldiers were as well although one wonders what difference this should make to anyone interested in their cause. Further, the movement was fragmented and full of radicals who joined under non-exclusionary umbrellas. In the fall of 1965, most middle-class adult liberals still supported the president. Stories like those in *Newsweek* helped Johnson to maintain their support given the unattractive sorts of young folk in leadership roles of the opposition movement. Moreover, the emphasis on draft-dodging also did not reflect well on the movement. Many Americans might have begun to feel nervous about the war, but most would never think of failing to heed their country's call to arms. Finally, the support for the movement from communist nations, noted by *Newsweek* and others, played into the hands of those in the White House who argued that antiwar demonstrations aided those who were killing American boys in Vietnam.

Characteristically, *Time* was even harder on the movement—if that were possible—in the wake of the International Days of Protest.[54] In an issue in which the optimistic cover story reported "The Turning Point in Vietnam," the magazine dismissed the demonstrators derisively as "a ragtag collection of unshaven and unscrubbed—they could be called Vietniks." *Time*'s reporters described the leaders of the NCCEWVN in unfavorable terms, and more important, alleged that the weekend's activities brought out more counter-demonstrators than demonstrators. That just was not true. Further, *Time* reported that one antiwar student hit a middle-aged mother of a soldier in the face and that the Days of Protest had confirmed the Senate Internal Security

Subcommittee's published warning about the radical nature of the movement. One of the two pictures accompanying the story showed counterdemonstrators with a large placard reading, "Victory in Vietnam / Down with Red Traitors."

For CBS, Berkeley was one of the centerpieces for its coverage of the Days of Protest because it was, as a correspondent noted, "the scene of the biggest, most disorderly student demonstration of last year." Of course, that "Free Speech" demonstration had nothing to do with the war. On the Friday, October 15, afternoon news, CBS reported a crowd of five to ten thousand likely to march to Oakland to hold a peaceful protest. A still bourgeois-appearing Jerry Rubin, described as a twenty-seven-year-old former sociology graduate student at Berkeley, explained the protestors' position in a dignified manner. Complaining about the unconstitutional denial of their rights by the Oakland police, Rubin reported that they were going to march anyway but would break no laws.

The teach-in, which began the day's events in Berkeley, appeared inaccurately on CBS to involve only a few hundred people, an interpretation reenforced by shots of students passing up the opportunity to take leaflets from organizers. Moreover, the only speaker chosen to reflect the teach-in activities was bearded. In 1965—if not the 1990s—people with beards appeared to be slightly seditious or at least outré. The impression was even more negative if the beard was combined with long and unkempt hair.

The CBS correspondent did quote university administrators who blamed right-wing politicians like Ronald Reagan and George Murphy for inflaming the situation. On the other hand, his Berkeley story closed with a snide reference to "a new academic year and a new cause," a clear diminution of the significance of the antiwar movement.[55]

On Friday night's newscast, the protest was Walter Cronkite's lead story, beginning in Berkeley where young people praised Ho Chi Minh, while others called the war immoral because "Americans [were] murdering innocent people." Despite the lack of a permit, the march to Oakland was ready to go, with six hundred National Guardsmen prepared to keep order if needed.

CBS accurately described the Harvard turnout as light, perhaps no more than one hundred protestors. One graduate student, who was rooting for a Viet Cong victory, had words of praise for communists in the antiwar movement because they understood American society. An interview with the editor of the *Harvard Crimson* made a better impression when he pointed out that although some in the movement were not students, the students in the movement tended to be among the brightest in their classes. Overall, the articulate editor felt that 10 percent of his classmates opposed the war and at least half were disturbed by American policy in Vietnam.

CBS's coverage at the Whitehall induction center was briefer on Friday evening, showing a small crowd and a speaker talking about Vietnamese children being bombed in schoolyards by Americans. In addition, viewers saw glimpses of picketers in Chicago numbering fewer than one hundred, who were met by counterpicketers carrying signs reading "No Compromise in Vietnam." There was little difference in the respectable clothing worn by doves and hawks in Chicago in the pre-hippie fall of 1965. The CBS correspondent noted that the University of Chicago was able to turn out only one hundred marchers opposing the war out of an enrollment of seven thousand. (This frequent disclaimer from both the print and broadcast media is akin to a sports reporter noting that while the Detroit Tigers attracted a sell-out crowd of fifty-one thousand, that represents only a very small percentage of the people who live in the Detroit metropolitan area.) Whatever the significance of the one hundred marchers, CBS's microphones picked up exchanges between them and counterdemonstrators with a dove calling the war genocide and a hawk responding that the United States would get out as soon as the communists did.

Another protest story that evening came from Madison, Wisconsin, where, in front of the student union, according to the reporter and the supporting visuals, few students were paying attention to the speakers. The student union, he noted ironically, had been erected to honor University of Wisconsin men who had fought in America's wars.

As if to punctuate that thought, Senators Dodd and John Stennis (D-MS) then appeared on the program to rail about communists and draft dodgers who were protesting. Anchor Walter Cronkite concluded the lengthy coverage by noting that, apparently by coincidence, small demonstrations in London, Paris, and Bonn also took place that day. He seemed not to understand that these were "international" days of protest.

Among the stories on Saturday's CBS newscast was one concerning another small protest in Chicago, this time involving a handful of Roosevelt University students confronted by counterdemonstrators. Both groups were unattractive with the doves shouting, "LBJ, LBJ, How many kids did you kill today" (perhaps the first time a national audience heard that chant), and the hawks carrying American flags, signs that proclaimed "Better Dead than Red," and pictures of doves with hammers and sickles on their breasts. Given more air time than the demonstrators, the counterdemonstrators explained that though the Roosevelt protests were a flop, they did encourage Hanoi.

As for California, "The biggest demonstration held yesterday was in Berkeley but it did not lead to any violence." That loaded statement clearly linked the expectation of violence with demonstrations. The correspondent did point out that most of the violence of the day was caused by counterdemonstrators but he also noted that North Vietnam approved of the rallies.

CBS's coverage on Sunday night was again rather extensive, despite the fact that the protests had all but ended on Saturday.[56] That night, a Wisconsin

antiwar leader was shown expressing satisfaction with the success of his demonstration outside an army base while Vice President Humphrey referred to the weekend's actions as "feeble, futile, and unnecessary."

This first weekend-long antiwar activity was the lead story on Monday night's news with White House aide Bill Moyers commenting that the president worried about its impact on Hanoi. Walter Cronkite reenforced the White House's concern by quoting from Russian and Chinese newspapers that were encouraged by the demonstrations. David J. Miller was then given a chance to explain his actions, which he said were a reflection of his Christian faith. His comments were followed by Senators Everett Dirksen (R-IL) and Gale McGhee (D-WY), both vigorous opponents of the International Days of Protest. During the early period of American escalation in Vietnam, it was difficult for editors to find dovish senators willing to appear on national television. Part of the problem was that most of the doves came from Democratic ranks, and few were willing to incur Lyndon Johnson's wrath.

Overall, CBS news paid a good deal of attention to the protests. In almost all accounts, the network balanced dovish presentations with those of their opponents. Moreover, seeking out the most provocative and dramatic activities, camera operators and directors left the impression that the demonstrations often led to clashes between two equally divided camps of demonstrators. Yet, the antiwar movement was getting its message on the air, with some of its spokespersons (even on a weekend sponsored by the left-leaning NCCEWVN), appearing as mature and reasonable adults. At this point, most viewers preferred the messages from administration spokespersons. CBS, however, forced them to share the limelight with antiwar critics, and in so doing treated the movement more favorably than most of the print media.

The networks usually tried to offer equal time to doves and hawks, or Republicans and Democrats for that matter. In 1965 and 1966, this approach favored the doves who were still a small minority of the population. Later, during the period from 1969 through 1971, equal time tended to work against the antiwar movement since a majority of the population had by then accepted the general outlines of its critique.

WITH GOOD REASON, THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION BEGAN to worry about the demonstrations. As early as September 16, its interdepartmental Public Affairs Planning Committee for Vietnam called for the release of some peaceful announcement during the "Berkeley-sponsored Days of Protest."[57] At the time, the memo writer thought that this was solely a Berkeley operation.

The State Department's weekly news roundup, *American Opinion Survey*, had begun running selections from editorials and columns on the war in the

fall of 1965. For the week ending November 3, its collators noted widespread support for administration policies everywhere with only a small percentage of students in opposition. Editorially that week, the administration could take comfort in support from the *Chicago Sun Times*, *Denver Post*, *Washington Star*, the Scripps-Howard chain, the *Chicago Tribune*, *U.S. News*, and the Hearst publications. The *Nation*, not unsurprisingly, was one of the few publications to support the demonstrations. The following week, with only the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* seen as unfavorable to Vietnam policy, the *Survey* added the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Washington Post*, and *Los Angeles Times* to the president's side. And a Harris poll revealed that two-thirds of those queried supported the policy in Vietnam. The newspaper clippings collected by the White House generally reflected the same line with emphasis on communist support and infiltration of the movement and draft dodging.[58]

The mailbag also brought the White House good news.[59] The week before the demonstration, monitors had tallied over 1,000 letters opposing the administration on Vietnam and only 59 supporting. The next week, after the Days of Protest, that count had changed to 444 in support and 1,289 against. Moreover, on the specific issue of the Days of Protest, the White House received only 7 letters from supporters of the antiwar activities compared to 135 that opposed them. The following week (ending October 28), the administration received more letters supporting Vietnam policy (921–807) than opposing it. It is impossible to explain just what led to this situation but negative depictions of the protests might have activated "patriotic" Americans to demonstrate their support for the president.

Nevertheless, movement leaders, along with the president, could take some comfort in their treatment by the media. The leaders were at least getting their stories in the papers and on the air, even if violence and rowdiness overshadowed their political message and growing strength. On television, especially, they received time to explain their positions. The president, on the other hand, had to be pleased by the negative images of protestors, editorial support from the press, and the fact that the International Days of Protest involved mostly unknown young people.

SANE Rally in Washington, November 27, 1965

The media had been suspicious about the political orientations of people involved in the International Days of Protest. Six weeks later they had the opportunity to cover a more decorous demonstration that involved respectable adults. The way they treated it offered clues to movement leaders—and to the White House—about the relative effectiveness of different dissenting strategies.

On Saturday, November 27, Washington was again the scene for a major

antiwar activity.[60] This one, organized by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), a respected and effective peace group, drew as many as thirty-five thousand participants. Although the final speaker, Carl Oglesby of SDS, delivered the most memorable address ("They are all honorable men. They are all liberals"), most who preceded him were moderates like author Saul Bellow and entertainer Tony Randall. SANE did not permit several noted radicals to speak, urged demonstrators to carry moderate placards and American flags, and issued a dress code. Not everyone adhered to the "rules"—several people insisted on carrying Viet Cong flags, a gesture that Dave Dellinger considered to be "senseless" and "inflammatory." (On one of his later trips to Hanoi, Vietnamese communists told him that American anti-warriors should carry American and not Viet Cong flags.)[61]

Despite the occasional Viet Cong flag and the fact that one thousand counterdemonstrators showed up to heckle, the November 27 activity in Washington produced little in terms of fiery rhetoric (except for the little-known Oglesby), civil disobedience, or peculiar costumes to engage the sensation-seeking media. Their sound bites and photographs of the characteristic activities of the day did not make for dramatic reportage.

The *Times* and the *Post* placed the SANE story on the front pages of their Sunday editions, but underestimated the crowd size, overestimated the importance of the counterdemonstrators and a handful of arrests, and all but ignored the many interesting and reasoned speeches.[62] In a rather anachronistic reference, both noted that few "beatniks" participated. Most important of all, the two influential dailies thought that the protest lacked spirit. What they meant was that it was dignified, serious, middle-class—and quite boring to people trying to sell papers.

CBS television's oral coverage that weekend was relatively accurate and fair to the protestors. But the network also offered enough scenes of violence and Viet Cong flags to produce a negative impression. Thus, viewers could have easily concluded that SANE people were the radicals and rowdies who provided the colorful action sequences on which the newscasts dwelled. Throughout the period, television consistently relied on the most extreme—and exciting—actions for their protest stories. After all, an antiwar talking head with short hair made for a dull sequence.

The *Guardian* again saw things differently than most other media. Not enthusiastic about SANE's moderation or the relative lack of "negroes" in the crowd, its correspondent nonetheless hailed the rally of forty thousand (a figure only five thousand more than most estimates), as the largest peace demonstration to date. We have seen how the radical newsweekly emphasized that each succeeding peace demonstration from April through November broke earlier records. In addition, as expected, it paid attention to the

speeches and perceptively explained the political origins of the "mighty march for peace."[63]

In general, despite the *Guardian*'s suggestion that the antiwar movement was taking off, the Johnson administration did not consider the SANE demonstration to be of much importance, even though it attracted middle-class people and was the largest one-city antiwar activity to date.[64] In part, the lukewarm press coverage reenforced its confidence as 1965 came to a close with less than 25 percent of the population thinking that American entry into the war was a mistake and with fewer than 10 percent calling for withdrawal. Further, about half of those polled approved of Johnson's handling of the war against 30 percent who opposed his policies. And that 30 percent was split between doves and hawks.

No doubt, as NSC aide Chester Cooper pointed out on the day of the SANE demonstration (for which he was administration point person), the problem posed by the antiwar movement was still a "cloud no-bigger-than on the horizon."[65] He was confident that with good public relations and a sensitivity toward those who were beginning to lean toward the doves, the president could ride out the storm. Of course, a lot depended on how the media covered the movement in the future. Up to this point, except for the teach-in and the expected favorable—and accurate—coverage from countercultural publications, the president and his allies had done quite well indeed.

Peter Benchley, oral history, 42–43, LBJL; Box 128, Office Files of Fred Panzer, LBJL. See also R. C. Bowman to Walt Rostow, November 17, 1967, box 98, National Security Council (hereafter NSC) country file, Vietnam (hereafter NSCVN), LBJL, for a survey of 26 newspaper editorials on bombing in Vietnam, and Rostow to Johnson, November 28, 1967, box 99, ibid., for another survey of editorial opinion.

25. Bundy to Johnson, March 29, 1965, vol. 9, McGeorge Bundy Memos to the President, NSF, LBJL. See also July 1, 1965, ibid., for an incomplete but extensive list of Bundy's press contacts during the month of June.

26. See the entire file in PR 3, WHCF, LBJL for criticism of the media and their responses; Rostow to Johnson, October 20, 1967, box 99, NSCVN, LBJL.

27. Turner, *Lyndon Johnson's Dual War*, 209; Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*, 331.

28. Johnson's meeting with Max Frankel, September 20, 1967, box 3, Meeting Notes File, LBJL; Johnson's meeting with Australian Broadcast group, September 20, 1967, ibid. See also, Benchley, oral history, 45, LBJL.

29. Bundy to Johnson, February 14, 1965, vol. 8, box 2, McGeorge Bundy Memos to the President, NSF, LBJL; Benchley, oral history, 3; Katherine Graham, oral history, 25–26, 35, LBJL. See also, Carol Felsenthal, *Power, Privilege, and the* Post: *The Katherine Graham Story* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1993), 239–244, 255–260.

30. Halberstam, *The Powers That Be*, 429–430; Turner, *Lyndon Johnson's Dual War*, 223.

31. Barry Zorthian quoted in Kim Willenson, *The Bad War: An Oral History of the Vietnam War* (New York: New American Library, 1987), 183.

32. Benchley, oral history, 42–43, LBJL. At NBC, Chet Huntley was personally pro-Johnson and David Brinkley was more skeptical about the president. Gans, *Deciding What's News*, 198.

33. For difficulties in evaluating mail, see Larry Levinson to Joseph Califano, February 12, 1966, box 219, ND19CO312, LBJL, and Califano to Johnson, February 24, 1966, box 9, WH 5–1, LBJL.

34. William E. Porter, *Assault on the Media: The Nixon Years* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1976), 27–28, 35; Joseph Spear, *Presidents and the Press: The Nixon Legacy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), 68.

35. H. R. Haldeman to Pat Buchanan, October 23, 1969, memos to Pat Buchanan, box 53, Haldeman files, NP; John Ehrlichman, *Witness to Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 332.

36. Ehrlichman, *Witness to Power*, 266.

37. See the discussion of this issue in Haldeman to Buchanan, July 10, 1969, in Bruce Oudes, ed., *From: The President: Richard Nixon's Secret Files* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), xii.

38. Pat Buchanan to Haldeman, May 6, 1971, box 1, Buchanan files, NP.

39. Richard Tanner Johnson, *Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 219–220; Spear, *Presidents and the Press*, 67; Porter, *Assault on the Media*, 57–59; Daniel Schorr, *Clearing the Air* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 33.

40. Haldeman to Klein, July 8, 1969, Haldeman folder 1, box 1, Klein files, NP.

41. Spear, *Presidents and the Press*, 67.

42. Colson to Anderson, April 12, 1971, box 1, Buchanan files, NP.

43. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962–1972* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 248–251.

44. Magruder to Haldeman, early 1971, box 4, Buchanan files, NP.

45. Haldeman to Ehrlichman, Ronald Ziegler, Klein, Kissinger, and Bryce Harlow, July 21, 1969, in Oudes, ed., *From: The President*, 36–37.

46. Even professionals make this error. Frank, *Out of Thin Air*, 41.

47. Alexander Butterfield to Nixon, October 7, 1969, November 1969 folder, box 138, Memoranda for the President, Haldeman files, NP.

48. Haldeman to Buchanan, October 23, 1969, box 53, H. R. Haldeman Memos to Buchanan, Haldeman files, NP; Nixon to Haldeman, November 24, 1969, box 1, President's Personal Files (hereafter PPF), NP; Nixon to Haldeman, May 11, 1970, 1970 folder, box 138, Memos from the President, Haldeman files, NP.

49. Haldeman to Magruder, February 4, 1970, in Spear, *Presidents and the Press*, 101; Raymond Price, *With Nixon* (New York: Viking, 1977), 181–182; Nixon to Ehrlichman, February 5, 1969 and Colson to Haldeman, August 16, 1971, in Oudes, ed., *From: The President*, 310. For an example of a successful campaign of unspontaneous letters from College Republicans in *Newsweek*, see Klein to Nixon, October 30, 1969, Memos to the President, box 3, Klein files, NP.

50. Porter, *Assault on the Media*, 60; Spear, *Presidents and the Press*, 144–146; Haldeman to Buchanan, September 9, 1969, in Oudes, ed., *From: The President*, 41. Interestingly, in an earlier period, George Christian also thought that ABC was the fairest network. Christian, *The President Steps Down*, 196. By 1970, even ABC adopted an antiwar perspective. Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching*, 218.

51. Seymour M. Hersh, "Nixon's Last Cover-up: The Tapes He Wants the Archives to Suppress," *New Yorker* (December 14, 1992): 92.

52. Colson to Haldeman, September 25, 1970, press and media folder 1, box 141, Haldeman files, NP. See also Julius Duscha, "The White House Watch Over TV and the Press," *New York Times Magazine* (August 20, 1972): 9, for Buchanan's comments. CBS head William Paley reported that Colson was polite, not threatening. Paley, *As It Happened*, 241.

53. Charles Colson, oral history, 39, 40, NP.

54. Ziegler to Haldeman, November 25, 1969, box 141, Press and Media File 2, part 2, Haldeman files, NP; Klein to Nixon, December 5, 1969, ibid. For an exhaustive list of the slants of national columnists compiled for Nixon, see Klein to Haldeman, June 11, 1969, Haldeman folder 1, box 1, Klein files, NP.

55. Price, *With Nixon*, 150, 183; Klein, *Making It Perfectly Clear*, 285.

56. Colson to Haldeman, April 5, 1972, box 95, Haldeman files, NP.

57. Price to Higby, February 5, 1971, box 129, ibid.

4. The Launching of a Movement

1. Quoted in Powers, *The War at Home*, 93.

2. *Washington Post* (hereafter *WP*), (November 28, 1965): 1.

3. DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal*, 111–112; Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984), 38–43, 73–76; Gitlin, *The Whole World Is*

Watching, 46–60; Gitlin, *The Sixties*, 81–86; Sale, *SDS*, 185–194; Miller, *"Democracy Is in the Streets,"* 231–234; Fred Halstead, *Out Now: A Participant's Account of the American Movement against the Vietnam War* (New York: Monad Press, 1978), 36–44; Dellinger, *From Yale to Jail*, 194–199; Gregory Nevala Calvert, *Democracy from the Heart: Spiritual Values, Decentralism, and Democratic Idealism in the Movement of the 1960s* (Eugene, Ore.: Communitas Press, 1991), 151–156.

4. *NYT* (April 17, 1965): 3.

5. *NYT* (April 18, 1965): 3.

6. Lapham, *The Wish for Kings*, 159. For a critique of the way the media misreported the massive July 12, 1982 anti-nuclear demonstrations and how they ignored "its causes and political ramifications [and] the substance of its speeches," see Robert Spiegelman, "Media Manipulation of the Movement," *Social Policy* 13 (summer 1982), 9–16.

7. Hallin, *"The Uncensored War,"* 88.

8. Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching*, 46–59, 75.

9. *WP* (April 18, 1965): 1, 18. The figure of sixteen thousand came from the Park police; none was reported from the leaders of the march in this instance.

10. *The Daily Tribune* (hereafter *DT*), (April 17, 1965): 1.

11. At a peace demonstration in Boston that same year, NBC reporter Sander Vanocur told Lewis Bateman, a well-dressed young man, that he was not a candidate for an interview because the network was not interested in people who looked like him. Author interview with Bateman, Washington, D.C., June 21, 1991.

12. *National Guardian* (hereafter *GRD*), (April 24, 1965): 1, 4.

13. Bundy to Johnson, April 14, 1965, box 9, McGeorge Bundy's Memos to the President, NSF, LBJL.

14. Valenti to Johnson, April 19, 1965, box 357, PR 18, LBJL.

15. Mail Summaries, box 1, WHCF, LBJL.

16. DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal*, 107–108; Powers, *The War at Home*, 61; Halstead, *Out Now*, 50–54; Louis Menashe and Ronald Radosh, eds., *Teach-Ins U.S.A.: Reports, Opinions, Documents* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

17. Small, *To Kill a Messenger*, 111.

18. The figure of seven hundred probably came from the membership of the group that put together the teach-in. Bundy later agreed to appear at another teach-in, a one-hour televised debate at Georgetown University on June 21, where his opposite number was University of Chicago political scientist, Hans Morgenthau. For discussion of this event, see Small, *To Kill a Messenger*, 111–112.

19. *NYT* (May 16, 1965): 1, 62.

20. *NYT* (May 17, 1965): 30–31.

21. *WP* (May 16, 1965): 1, 21.

22. Ibid., 23.

23. *DT* (May 15, 1965): 1.

24. *DT* (May 17, 1965): 12.

25. *Newsweek* (hereafter *NW*) (May 24, 1965): 28.

26. *Time* (May 21, 1965): 25.

27. Cooper to Valenti, May 17, 1965, reel 6, PDS, NP.

28. Rostow to Rusk, May 17, 1965, box 18, files of McGeorge Bundy, NSF, LBJL.

29. Box 174, WDT.

30. Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves*, 50–51.

31. Box 1, Mail Summaries, LBJL; poll figures found throughout Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves*.

32. DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal*, 125–127; Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching*, 85–87; Zaroulis and Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?* 56; Halstead, *Out Now*, 68–91; Powers, *The War at Home*, 85–88; Sale, *SDS*, 288–331; Rorabaugh, *Berkeley at War*, 95–98.

33. Women in general rarely received leadership designations from the media despite their often central roles in the movement. See the articles by Amy Swerdlow, Alice Echols, and Nina Adams on the subject in Small and Hoover, eds., *Give Peace a Chance*, 159–198.

34. *NYT* (October 16, 1965): 1, 2.

35. Sale, *SDS*, 228.

36. *NYT* (October 17, 1965): 1, 43.

37. *WP* (October 16, 1965): 1, 12.

38. *WP* (October 17, 1965): 1.

39. For a discussion of the attempt by Walter Lippmann, who was antiwar, to get rid of Wiggins earlier than 1968, see Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (New York: Vintage, 1981), 571.

40. *DT* (October 16, 1965): 1.

41. *DT* (October 18, 1965): 12, 15.

42. Ibid., 15.

43. *Macomb Daily* (hereafter *MD*), (October 16, 1965): 1.

44. *MD* (October 18, 1965): 6

45. *Village Voice* (hereafter *VV*), (October 21, 1965): 3. The *Voice* began publication in 1956 devoted primarily to its New York neighborhood. In 1965, it was still a very slender, mostly cultural newsweekly with little space devoted to political news. With the rise of the New Left, the antiwar movement, and the counterculture, it became much thicker and much less parochial with a readership, by subscription, extending throughout the United States.

46. *GRD* (October 23, 1965): 1, 6.

47. *NW* (October 25, 1965): 98.

48. See also, ibid., 30.

49. *NW* (November 1, 1965): 25, 31.

50. Ibid., 25–26, 31–34.

51. Ibid., 26.

52. Ibid., 31.

53. Ibid., 32.

54. *Time* (October 22, 1965): 25.

55. This advance report also included mention of demonstrations in Madison and New York, as well as a statement from Senator Dodd that the leadership of the demonstration had passed from "moderates to Communists and other extremist elements."

56. Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching*, 94.

57. September 16, 1965 memo, box 196, NSCVN, LBJL.

58. Box 174, WDT, LBJL.

59. Box 1, Mail Summaries, LBJL.

60. DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal*, 131–132; Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching*, 116–123; Powers, *The War at Home*, 89–93; Halstead, *Out Now*, 93–94, 112–115; Zaroulis and Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?* 63–66; Sale, *SDS*, 242–244; Dellinger, *From Yale to Jail*, 204–208.

61. Dellinger, *From Yale to Jail*, 206.

62. *NYT* (October 28, 1965): 1; *WP* (October 28, 1965): 1. See also *NW* (December 6, 1965): 28–29; and *Time* (December 3, 1965): 27.

63. *GRD* (December 4, 1965): 1,4,6.

64. Lee White to Bill Moyers, December 2, 1965, box 357, PR 18; poll, December 14, 1965, box 346, PR 18; boxes 174 and 175, WDT; box 180, Office Files of Fred Panzer, LBJL.

65. Cooper to Bundy, November 27, 1965, box 57, Hu-4 Freedoms, confidential, LBJL.

5. From Fulbright to the Pentagon

1. Norman Mailer, *The Armies of the Night: History as Novel, The Novel as History* (New York: New American Library, 1968), 297–298.

2. *NYT* (October 23, 1967): 1.

3. Box 180, Panzer files, LBJL.

4. Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves*, 78–81; Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 247–250, Zaroulis and Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?* 71–77; Halberstam, *The Powers That Be*, 503–507; Powers, *The War at Home*, 109–116; Friendly, *Due to Circumstances Beyond Our Control*, 212–265.

5. Zaroulis and Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?* 75; Hallin, *"The Uncensored War,"* 192.

6. Hayes Redmon to Bill Moyers, February 27, 1966, box 71, ND19CO312 confidential, LBJL.

7. *NYT* (February 9, 1966): 1; *WP* (February 9, 1966): 1.

8. *NW* (February 21, 1966): 27. See also *Time*, which took the administration's side, quoting Truman on Fulbright as an "overeducated Oxford s.o.b." (February 18, 1966): 22.

9. Richard Berlin (the president of the Hearst corporation) to Johnson, February 21, 1966, and Ernest K. Lindley to Jack Valenti, March 4, 1966, box 432, FG 431 F, LBJL; Mail Summaries, box 1, LBJL. The administration was so proud of Rusk's and Taylor's performances that it used them in newsreels made for distribution in Europe. Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 248–249.

10. Reedy to Johnson, February 17, 1966, box 80, ND19CO312, LBJL.

11. Zaroulis and Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?* 79–80; Powers, *The War at Home*, 169; Halstead, *Out Now*, 139–144; DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal*, 149–150.

12. Powers, *The War at Home*, 121.

13. *NYT* (March 25, 1966): 3, (March 26, 1966): 1; *WP* (March 26, 1966): 8, (March 27, 1966): 1. See also *DT* (March 26, 1966): 1; and *MD* (March 26, 1966, March 28, 1966): 1, 6.

14. *NW* (April 4, 1966): 32, (April 11, 1966): 34.

15. In its April 8 number (p.28), *Time* did run a brief story about how patriots in South Boston beat up several draft-card burners but did not mention the International Days of Protest.

16. *VV* (March 31, 1966): 1, 18–19.

17. *GRD* (April 2, 1966): 1–6.

18. Box 347, PR 16, LBJL. See also clippings for March 28 and 29, 1966, box 202, WDT, LBJL. The International Days of Protest was one of those rare demonstrations that produced more dovish than hawkish mail in the White House mail bags, however. Mail Summaries, box 1, LBJL. The Defense Department did not register comparable tallies. Califano to Johnson, April 7, 1966, box 9, WH 5–1, LBJL.

19. Zaroulis and Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?* 94–96; Steve Kelman, *Push Comes to Shove* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), 54–61; Powers, *The War at Home*, 135–137.

20. *NYT* (November 8, 1966): 1, (November 9, 1966): 3; *WP* (November 8, 1966): 1; *NW* (November 21, 1966): 50–51; *Time* (November 18, 1966): 95.

21. Harrison E. Salisbury, *A Time of Change: A Reporter's Tale of Our Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 116–183; Talese, *The Kingdom and the Power*, 446–451; Hammond, *Public Affairs*, 247–279; Goulding, *Confirm or Deny*, 52–92; Joseph C. Goulden, *Fit to Print*, 142–145; James Boylan, "Survey: A Salisbury Chronicle," *Columbia Journalism Review* 5 (winter 1966–67): 10–14; Wyatt, *Paper Soldiers*, 153–155.

22. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny*, 92. Goulding also wrote that no story during his four years in office "so disturbed me, and none so disturbed my associates in government," 79.

23. *WP* (December 28, 1966): 1.

24. Harrison E. Salisbury, oral history, 31, LBJL.

25. *NYT* (December 28, 1966): 1–4.

26. *Time* (January 6, 1967): 14. *Newsweek* was more favorable to Salisbury in its January 9, 1967 issue, 17–18.

27. *GRD* (November 7, 1967): 1–2.

28. Tom Johnson to Lyndon Johnson, January 10, 1967, box 348, PR 16 and Dixon Donnelly to Bill Moyers, January 12, 1967, box 223, ND19CO312, LBJL. William Hammond, in *Public Affairs*, 276–277, saw the press as more evenly split while James Aronson agreed with the State Department in *The Press and the Cold War* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 255–258.

29. Rostow to Johnson, box 7, Rostow Memos, NS File Name file, LBJL; Boylan, "Survey," 13; Goulding, *Confirm or Deny*, 13.

30. For information on this campaign and how it contributed to disillusionment after the Tet Offensive in 1968, see Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves*, 122–124.

31. DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal*, 172–174; Zaroulis and Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?* 108–111; Powers, *The War at Home*, 160–163; Herbert Shapiro, "The Vietnam War and the American Civil Rights Movement," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 16 (winter 1989): 117–141.

32. *NYT* (April 5, 1967): 1; *WP* (April 5, 1967): 1,13. See also *DT*, (April 5, 1967): 36.

33. *NW* (April 14, 1967): 32; *Time* (April 10, 1967): 32.

34. On the importance of "inflammatory" rhetoric to maintain group morale, see Margolis and Burtt, "Revolutionaries of the Status Quo," 199.

35. DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal*, 174–177; Zaroulis and Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?* 110–116; Powers, *The War at Home*, 181–184; Sale, *SDS*, 322–333;